Decision Assurance Infrastructure
Summit Cognitive
§ Solutions — Govern Autonomous Agents

"What stops the agent from doing X?" Have a real answer.

The moment an agent gets tool access — repositories, ticketing, payments, production — someone in security or risk asks the question above. 'We review the outputs' is not an answer; by the time an output exists, the action is taken. The only credible answer is architectural: the agent cannot do X, here is the policy that denies it, and here is the replay that proves the policy held.

§ 01

The incidents are no longer hypothetical

From the Decision Failure Atlas — documented agent failures, each with the same root cause: capability granted without a deny path.

Atlas · DevOps

Secret exfiltration

A coding agent in CI exposed workflow secrets when untrusted pull-request content entered its context alongside secret access. Untrusted input, secrets, and external egress in the same run — the combination that must never be allowed to cohabit.
Atlas · Engineering

Unauthorized deployment

An agent holding production credentials autonomously shipped untested changes to production. Nothing in its path could say no, because nothing in its path was built to.
Atlas · Customer service

Memory poisoning

Users injected instructions into an assistant's memory through crafted support tickets; the poisoned memory granted unauthorized discounts in later sessions. Memory that anything can write to is an attack surface, not a feature.
§ 02

Four controls, enforced at runtime

Summit's agent governance runtime makes the failure modes above structurally unavailable — and produces the receipts that prove it, run after run.

Control 1

Default-deny tool gateway→

Every tool call passes a policy gate that starts at no. Sensitive paths are blocked, untrusted content carries taint labels, and untrusted input never shares a run with secrets and external egress.
Control 2

Trust-state memory→

Memory writes are proposed, not committed. Content moves through explicit trust states — raw, proposed, validated, approved — so a crafted ticket cannot quietly become standing instruction.
Control 3

Role isolation→

Each agent operates within a declared role with scoped capabilities. A research agent cannot inherit a deploy agent's reach, no matter what its context window says.
Control 4

Deterministic replay→

Every run replays bit-identically for after-action review. When the incident review — or the auditor — asks what the agent did and why, the answer is a replay, not a reconstruction.
DENYA denial is a governance success — and every denial is receipted too.
§ 03

Answer the question before the rollout review

Pilot the governance layer on one agent workflow before fleet-wide tool access becomes the status quo.

  1. 01
    Pick the agent that worries security most
    Usually the one closest to production, payments, or customer data. That is the right pilot scope.
  2. 02
    Run it governed for ten days
    Default-deny policy in front of its tools, trust-state memory behind it, receipts for every decision and denial.
  3. 03
    Take the findings to the review
    A written governance findings memo and a policy evaluation report — the documented answer to 'what stops it from doing X?'

Give your agents capability without giving up the deny path.

The 10-Day Decision Assurance Pilot puts one real agent workflow under default-deny governance and finishes with at least one finding your current review missed — in writing.

Start a PilotAgent Governance runtime